Mass Retailers’ Advertising Strategies Faced with Different Competitor Store Formats: Commodity Stores or Hard Discounts by Bergès, Fabian & Monier-Dilhan, Sylvette
  
12-277 
February, 2012 
Mass Retailers’ Advertising 
Strategies Faced with Different 
Competitor Store Formats: 
Commodity Stores or Hard 
Discounts 
FABIAN BERGES AND SYLVETTE MONIER-
DILHAN   
Research Group: Environmental Economics and Natural Resources  
  
Retailers’ Advertising Strategies Faced with CS or HD.    Page 1 / 30. 
Mass Retailers’ Advertising Strategies 
Faced with Different Competitor Store Formats: 
Commodity Stores or Hard Discounts. 
 
 
Fabian BERGÈS & Sylvette MONIER-DILHAN 
TSE (Gremaq-Inra) 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 A retailer has different opportunities to advertise in the media: emphasizing the store 
image or promoting specifically its private label (PL). In the first option, advertising benefits 
all products sold, whereas in the alternative, only store brands are concerned by image 
improvement. 
 
We analyze the retailer’s advertising campaign strategy distinguishing its competitor’s 
format: commodity store or hard-discounter. PL quality is endogenous and chosen according 
to the competitor’s product range. 
 
We show the retailer prefers to advertise the store rather than its PL. However, this 
strategy may push commodity stores out of the market and reduce social welfare. 
 
JEL Codes : L15, M37, L41. 
Keywords: Advertising, Retailing, Competition. 
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Introduction 
 
 Advertising campaigns constitute an important non-price strategy for retailers to 
develop their sales. Indeed, the retailing sector devotes 1.5 % of its total turnover to 
advertising expenditures. This represents 2’962 millions € for France in 2011, which places 
retailers as the first rank among sectors in terms of budget spent (followed by the Automobile 
industry and food manufacturers).1  In table 1, the advertising expenditures of , the four 
biggest French retailing chains (Carrefour, Leclerc, Intermarché and Auchan) are  reported in 
terms of the  different advertising media used (press, radio, TV, external displays, internet2 
 
Marketer Press Radio TV External displays Internet 
Carrefour 20.21 40.71 16.96 17.64 4.48 
E. Leclerc 19.85 45.7 9.29 10.7 4.46 
Intermarché 14.6 58.61 14.46 6.96 5.38 
Auchan 9.53 58.31 13.23 12.3 6.63 
Table 1: Advertising distribution of retailers in 2010 
(source Kantar Media) 
 
 Globally, retailers use the different media the same way, indicating that they do not 
differentiate their strategies for advertising. Radio is the most important media for retail 
advertising (about 50%). TV is the prevailing media for advertising by agrofood 
manufacturers (more than 75%) whereas this media represents less than 17% of retailers’ 
advertisements. This can be explained by the fact that TV has been a new media for 
distributors since January 2007, when France repealed an old law from 1968 forbidding 
retailers from broadcasting their advertisements on TV. 3 
                                                            
1 Advertising expenditures are computed over the 10 first months of 2011 in order to avoid Christmas effect. 
2 These ratailers are among the top 20 marketers. 
3 The French decree of the 7th October 2003 opened retailing advertising to local broadcasting for January 2004 
and to national TV in January 2007. 
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Over the last 30 years, retailers have become “double agents” by not only reselling 
brand manufacturers’ goods but also by introducing their own private labels (also named store 
brands), the market share of which reached 35% in France in 2010 according to the Private 
Label Manufacturers’ Association statistical yearbook. The consequence is that competition 
between retailers has become twofold: on the one hand, retailers compete with each other 
(intrabrand store competition) and on the other hand, national brands compete with private 
labels within each retail store (interbrand competition). Because of this dual role (as retailers 
and as store brand manufacturers), distributors have to choose between two possible messages 
in their advertising campaign. They can emphasize the general store image, irrespectively of 
the products sold in the store (like Carrefour and the ‘blue line’ campaign) or they can 
communicate specifically on their private labels (PL) in order to increase interbrand 
competition.4 Retailers’ advertising strategy thus exhibits a specificity generating a particular 
trade-off that brand manufacturers do not face. 
 The economic literature on advertising is quite vast (Bagwell, 2008). Textbooks 
generally distinguish three kinds of advertising campaign related to their impact on 
consumers’ utility. The first two are the most common: informative advertising and 
persuasive advertising. Informative advertising (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986) provides general 
information about the product advertised to consumers (existence, characteristics, etc.). By 
enhancing the consumers’ potential choice set, the resulting demand becomes more elastic or 
consumers make firms compete more. This kind of advertising is thus seen as welfare 
enhancing as it reduces the firms’ market power. Persuasive advertising (Braithwaite, 1928), 
however, alters consumers’ tastes by increasing product differentiation and their willingness-
to-pay for the good advertised, leading to a less elastic demand. It can result in higher prices 
                                                            
4 Carrefour,  a  major  French  retailing  group  with  more  than  25%  of  market  share,  initiated  in  2009  a  TV 
advertising campaign promoting their new ‘blue  line’ concept. At cash tills, when the queue exceeds the blue 
line on  the ground, Carrefour commits  to opening more  tills  in order  to reduce  the waiting  time  to  the cash 
desk. Intermarché and Leclerc, two other French big retailers, clearly based their advertising contents on their 
store brands by promoting their value for money compared to equivalent branded products. 
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because of reduced competition or by deterring new firms, resulting in lower social welfare. 
Becker & Murphy (1993) characterized a third kind of advertising called “complementary 
advertising”. In their view, the intensity of advertising becomes a part of consumers’ utility by 
defining a ‘social image’ linked to the consumption of the advertised good, but nonetheless 
generating a positive externality on competing goods for consumers. The social welfare 
effects of such advertising are ambiguous. 
 Most articles considering manufacturers’ advertising find a positive link with average 
retail prices as reported in Steiner (1998). The presence of a private label in the retailer’s 
supply does not jeopardize this result as shown by Soberman and Parker (2006). However, 
there are not many articles about retailers’ advertising strategies per se in the presence of 
private labels. Karray and Martín-Herrán (2008) study a particular framework where local 
monopolist retailers only provide institutional advertising increasing willingness-to-pay for all 
products sold in-store (national brand and private label). In the absence of analytical solutions, 
they show through numerical simulations that the effect of persuasive advertising on final 
prices is ambiguous: it brings down total demand while increasing product differentiation. 
Karray and Martín-Herrán (2009) develop a model of vertical relationships where a retailer 
sells a national brand and a private label perceived as horizontally differentiated in their 
characteristics. The advertising investments are made by the manufacturer for the national 
brand and by the retailer for the store image. Each kind of advertisement alters consumers’ 
tastes for both products simultaneously. Their conclusion is that the retailer may limit his 
store advertising investment since it increases competition with the national brand product, 
generating lower prices and thus lower revenues. From an empirical point of view, the main 
question relates to the efficiency of retailers’ advertising. Reiley and Lewis (2011) find that 
Yahoo! ads promoting a Video On Demand (VOD) website significantly increase VOD 
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demand and are very profitable. They also note that the sales effects remain persistent for 
weeks even in the absence of renewed advertising. 
 The dual nature of retailers enhances their possible advertising strategy in the sense 
that they can decide to promote either their store image or their own brand. One of the 
determinants of the choice between these alternatives may be the nature of the rival retailers 
they are competing with. Traditional mass retailers face two different kinds of competitors 
when selling agrofood goods: commodity stores (CS) or hard-discounters (HD).5 
 The objective of our article is to investigate how retailers’ image positioning 
influences the choice of advertising. It is also to find out whether there are any 
anticompetitive effects of mass retailers’ advertising on their competitors. In the framework 
we develop, advertising is mainly persuasive (changing preferences across retailers). 
 In section 1, we present the framework by characterizing retailers’ supply as well as 
consumer preferences. Section 2 and section 3 analyze the competitive equilibrium in 
advertising strategy between mass retailers with respectively commodity stores/hard-
discounts. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. The framework 
 
1.1 Retailers’ supply 
We consider two vertically differentiated retailers, R1 and R2. Retailer 1 sells two 
goods: the national brand (NB) with quality ݍ୒୆  and the private label product (PL) with 
quality q୔୐. It is assumed that the quality of the PL is chosen by R1 but it is still lower than 
that of the NB: q୔୐ ൏ q୒୆. This is a classic assumption in the economic literature on PL 
                                                            
5 Commodity stores refer to traditional stores or small convenience stores, mainly selling food products. Hard‐
discounters are characterized by everyday‐low‐pricing, narrow choice and no service. 
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quality (Mills, 1995, 1998 and Bontems et al., 1999).6 This generates a higher willingness-to-
pay for national brands than for private labels (see Bell, 2000 or Bergès et al., 2009). Retailer 
2 sells only one good (G2) with quality 	qୋଶ.  
We consider the following alternative cases for this retailer: R2 is either a hard 
discounter (HD) or a commodity store (CS). A commodity store is generally a small store 
located downtown contrary  to supermarkets and hypermarkets. 
When R1 is facing a CS, one can consider that they both sell the same NB good, but 
since the quality perceived by consumers depends on the store’s characteristics (CS location 
close to consumers’ home, in-store services provided), it could finally result in q୔୐ ൏ q୒୆ ൏
qୋଶ ൌ 1. Conversely, when R2 is a HD, we pragmatically assume that quality levels are such 
that ݍୋଶ ൏ ݍ௉௅ ൏ ݍ୒୆ ൌ 1. 7 
 
We assume that the two retailers face the same cost function, linear in the total 
quantity produced (X) but quadratic in the quality (ݍ௜ ): 	ܥሺܺ, ݍ௜ሻ ൌ ௤೔
మ
ଶ ܺ . Note that the 
marginal cost of quality is constant in the quantity produced but increasing in the level of 
quality chosen. 
 
In addition to the choice of PL quality, retailer R1 can implement an advertising 
campaign. He must decide between two kinds of advertising message: store versus product 
(denoted SA vs PA). The store advertisement results in an increase in store image that 
modifies the consumer’s utility, as soon as he/she consumes the NB or the PL sold by this 
specific retailer R1. The product advertisement impacts only on the private label by increasing 
                                                            
6 Empirical analysis (Dodds et al., 1991) shows that brand names have a positive effect on perception of quality 
and willingness to pay. This article focuses on private  labels that mimic NB products but often sell at a  lower 
price. It does not apply to high‐quality private labels. 
7 In both cases the high quality level is normalized to 1. 
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the PL product’s quality as perceived by the consumer.8 We will consider the mass-media 
campaign as a fixed cost for the retailer, depending only on the advertisement’s intensity, like 
the duration of broadcasting (TV, radio), irrespective of the quantity sold. 
1.2 Consumer preferences 
Faced with the choice set ሼܰܤ, ܲܮ, ܩ2ሽ., each consumer buys at most one unit of either 
good: preferences are of the Mussa-Rosen (1978) type. Each consumer is indexed by a 
parameter ߠ  measuring his taste for quality, and ߠ  is uniformly distributed in the interval 
ሾ0,1ሿ. The consumer characterized by ߠderives a utility ௜ܷ ൌ ߠ. ݍ௜ െ ݌௜  from consuming a 
unit of good of quality ݍ௜ sold at price ݌௜, where ݅ ൌ ሼܰܤ, ܲܮ, ܩ2ሽ. Utility is zero if neither 
good is bought. Faced with retailers’ prices, the consumer classically chooses the product that 
provides the highest level of utility. 
Regarding advertising, if the intensity of the advertisement is defined by ߤ , the two 
possible advertising strategies of R1 (SA or PA) impact in the following way on consumers’ 
utility: 
 For store advertising, R1’s image is increased by ߤௌ஺ according to quality taste but 
independently of the good bought in R1. The utility function becomes: ௜ܷ ൌ
ߠ. ߤௌ஺ ൅ ߠ. ݍ௜ െ ݌௜ for ݅ ൌ ሼܰܤ1, ܲܮሽ. 
 In the case of product advertising, only the perceived PL quality increases from 
ݍ௉௅	to	ሺݍ௉௅ ൅ ߤ௉஺ሻ . The utility derived from PL consumption thus becomes: 
ܷ௉௅ ൌ ߠሺݍ௉௅ ൅ ߤ௉஺ሻ െ ݌௉௅. 
                                                            
8 Irrespective of the strategy chosen, SA or PA, both advertisements are in fact “persuasive advertising” in the 
sense that they increase consumers’ willingness‐to‐pay either for R1 in the case of SA, or for the PL in the case 
of PA.  In  this  framework, because of  the  implicit assumption of perfect  information by consumers  (retailers’ 
products range and prices are known before the purchase), there is no scope for “informative advertising”. 
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Moreover, regardless of the strategy chosen by R1, we assume that the fixed cost of 
advertising necessary to finance a mass-media campaign of intensity ߤ௝ is ܿ൫ߤ௝൯ ൌ ൫ఓೕ൯
మ
ଶ  for 
݆ ൌ ሼܵܣ, ܲܣሽ. 
 
The timing of the game is as follows: 
- In the first stage, retailer R1 chooses the quality of the private label good according to 
the quality of the national brand (ݍே஻ ) he sells, and the product quality of his 
competitor (ݍீଶ). 
- In the second stage, R1 chooses its advertising strategy (SA or PA), as well as its 
intensity (ߤ௝). 
- In the third stage, retailers R1 and R2 compete on prices. 
Note that this timing is consistent with retailers’ commitments in the sense that quality 
definition is more irreversible than a retailer’s advertising campaign or final prices. 
 
We now turn to the analysis of the preferred advertising campaign depending on whether 
R1 faces a CS competitor or a HD rival. 
 
2. Competition against a Commodity Store 
 
We consider the situation where retailer R1 competes with a commodity store. We 
characterize the commodity store such that, at the same price, consumers would buy the 
product G2 even if the intrinsic characteristics of products NB and G2 were the same. This is 
due to the fact that, for example, retailer 2 benefits from a better geographical position (city 
center with higher population density). We first define the benchmark equilibrium 
characterized by the fact that retailer R1 does not advertise. The choice of PL quality ሺݍ௉௅ሻ is 
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made by R1 according to the quality of the NB ሺݍே஻ሻ and that of G2 ሺݍீଶሻ, respecting the 
following quality ranking: q୔୐ ൏ q୒୆ ൏ qୋଶ ൌ 1. We then look for the optimal advertising 
strategies and derive the equilibrium chosen by R1. 
 
2.1 Benchmark 
We first compute demands by characterizing the indifferent marginal consumers. 
ߠ଴/௉௅ ൌ 	 ୮ౌై୯ౌై denotes the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying the PL or 
nothing, ߠ௉௅/ே஻ ൌ 	 ௣ಿಳି୮ౌై௤ಿಳି	୯ౌై is the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying the 
PL or the NB in R1 and ߠே஻/ீଶ ൌ 	 ୮ృమି௣ಿಳଵି௤ಿಳ  is the marginal consumer who is indifferent 
between buying the NB product	or	the	product	G2.	Demands	for	products	are	thus	defined	
by:	
Dୋଶ ൌ 1 െ	pୋଶ െ p୒୆1 െ q୒୆ 	; 	D୒୆ 	ൌ 	
pୋଶ െ p୒୆
1 െ q୒୆ െ	
p୒୆ െ p୔୐
q୒୆ െ	q୔୐ 			 ; 		D୔୐ 	ൌ 	
݌ே஻ െ p୔୐
ݍே஻ െ	q୔୐ െ	
p୔୐
q୔୐ ;	D଴ ൌ 	
p୔୐
q୔୐ 
Retailers’ profits are given by: 
Πଵ஻ ൌ ܦே஻	ሺ	݌ே஻ െ ௤ಿಳ
మ
ଶ ሻ ൅ ܦ௉௅ሺ݌௉௅ െ
௤ುಽమ
ଶ ሻ  and  Πଶ஻ ൌ ܦீଶሺ	݌ீଶ െ 1ሻ 
 
These definitions are valid only if: ߠ଴/௉௅ ൏ ߠ௉௅/ே஻ ൏ ߠே஻/ீଶ  (such conditions are 
checked at equilibrium). Competition in prices between R1 and R2, for a given PL quality, 
leads to: 
p୔୐ ൌ 14 q୔୐ ൬
6
4 െ q୒୆ െ ሺq୒୆ െ q୔୐ሻ൰ ; p୒୆ ൌ
3	q୒୆
8 െ 2	q୒୆ 		and	pୋଶ ൌ
3
4 െ q୒୆ െ
q୒୆
2 		
Incorporating these equilibrium prices and maximizing Πଵ୆ with respect to q୔୐ results 
in: ݍ௉௅∗ ሺqNBሻ ൌ qNBଶ . Classically, the higher the NB quality R1 sells, the higher the PL product 
quality should be in order to increase final prices (market power). Note that the degree of 
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differentiation of products sold by R1 increases with the level of quality. Indeed, in order to 
attract consumers with low taste for quality, the intensity of the increase in PL quality is lower 
than the NB one since there is no other competitor in the low-quality range. 
 
2.2 Store Advertising 
Given the market configuration, store advertising impacts directly on two marginal 
consumers: the one who is indifferent between buying the private label product or nothing 
(ߠ଴/௉௅ ൌ 	 ୮ౌై୯ౌైାఓೄಲ and the one who is indifferent between buying the NB at R1 or the higher 
quality good at R2 (θ୒୆/ୋଶ ൌ 	 ୮ృమି୮ొాଵିሺ୯ొాାஜ౏ఽሻ	ሻ . We assume that the choice of advertising 
intensity still maintains the original range of qualities: q୔୐ ൅ μୗ୅ ൏ q୒୆ ൅ μୗ୅ ൏ qୋଶ ൌ 1. 
Demands for products and profits for firms are: 
Dୋଶ ൌ 1 െ	 ୮ృమି୮ొాଵିሺ୯ొాା	ஜ౏ఽሻ	 ; 	D୒୆ ൌ 	
୮ృమି୮ొా
ଵିሺ୯ొాା	ஜ౏ఽሻ	 െ 	
୮ొాି୮ౌై
୯ొాି୯ౌై ; 	D୔୐ 	ൌ 		
୮ొాି୮ౌై
୯ొాି୯ౌై 	െ	
୮ౌై
୯ౌైାஜ౏ఽ ;	D଴ 		
୮ౌై
୯ౌైାஜ౏ఽ  
Πଵୗ୅ ൌ 	D୒୆	ሺp୒୆ െ ୯ొా
మ
ଶ ሻ 	൅ D୔୐	ሺ	p୔୐ െ
୯ౌైమ
ଶ ሻ െ cሺμୗ୅ሻ , with cሺμୗ୅ሻ ൌ
൫	ஜ౏ఽ൯²
ଶ  and 
Πଶୗ୅ ൌ Dୋଶሺpୋଶ െ 1ሻ 
The equilibrium, solved numerically by computing the optimal prices (Appendix A.1) 
and then the optimal SA intensity (given the PL quality decided in the benchmark case), is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Optimal SA intensity with respect to the NB product. 
 
First, it is interesting to note that an increase in the NB quality sold by R1 results in an 
increase in store advertising intensity. This comes from two effects. On the one hand, 
reducing product differentiation between the NB and G2 increases competition with R2, 
leading to a lower G2 demand but also to a lower NB price; on the other hand, a SA increase 
allows R1 to restore good PL value for money (and improve market coverage) in order to 
temper the PL price increase generated by the rise in q୔୐. 
Second, there exists a range of NB quality (q୒୆ ൐ 0.42) such that SA intensity 
annihilates the commodity store’s demand for good G2. Imposing the constraint that the rival 
retailer’s demand for G2 should be at least positive generates a decrease in 	μୗ୅. 
Therefore, for a sufficiently high q୒୆, R1 is able to push R2 out of the market by 
selecting an appropriate ሺp෤୒୆, μୗ୅ሻ such that Dୋଶሺp෤୒୆, μୗ୅, pୋଶሻ ൌ 0. R1, in this regime, will 
behave as a monopoly. The limit price for the NB such that R2’s demand is nil is defined by: 
Dୋଶሺp෤୒୆, μୗ୅, pୋଶሻ ൌ 0	 ⇔ p෤୒୆ሺμୗ୅ሻ ൌ 1 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ μୗ୅ െ െ10 ൅ q୒୆
ଶ
2ሺq୒୆ ൅ μୗ୅ െ 4ሻ	 
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 In order to keep R2 out of the market, R1 has to set a relatively low price for its NB 
good generating an opportunity cost for this strategy. However, the possibility of store 
advertising is a relief for R1 in the sense that the limit NB price is increasing in μୗ୅.9 The 
higher the advertising intensity, the lower the opportunity cost of keeping R2 out of the 
market, since the limit price required for such action increases. 
 Numerically computing the new monopoly equilibrium (denoted SAm, Appendix A.2) 
leads to optimal store advertising depicted Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Optimal SAm intensity in the absence of R2. 
 
 In the monopoly section, we first find that μୗ୅୫ ൐ μୗ୅. Since there is no longer a 
competitor selling a higher-quality good, R1 uses store advertising to increase perceived 
quality (and to lower the opportunity cost of excluding R2) and benefits from high-valuation 
consumer rent extraction. However, when q୒୆ rises, μୗ୅୫ decreases because the absence of 
competition gives R1 no incentive to maintain a differentiation in quality with his rival 
through the NB product. A second consequence of R1 being a monopoly is the decrease in 
market coverage because of market power exertion. 
                                                            
9 One can check that  பሺ୮෥ొా൫ஜ౏ఽ൯ሻபஜ౏ఽ ൌ 1 ൅
ିଵ଴ା୯ొామ
ଶሺିସା୯ొాାஜ౏ఽሻమ ൐ 0  since q୒୆ ൅ μ
ୗ୅ ൏ 1. 
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2.3 Product Advertising 
The effect of product advertising is comparable to an increase in perceived PL quality 
(respecting the constraint: q୔୐ ൅ μ୔୅ ൏ q୒୆). So only marginal consumers with this good in 
their set choice are directly concerned by the advertisement: θ଴/୔୐ ൌ 	 ୮ౌై୯ౌైାஜౌఽ and θ୔୐/୒୆ ൌ
	 ୮ొాି୮ౌై୯ొాିሺ୯ౌైାஜౌఽሻ . Demands are as follows: 
Dୋଶ ൌ 1 െ	pୋଶ െ p୒୆1 െ q୒୆ ;	D୒୆ ൌ 	
pୋଶ െ p୒୆
1 െ q୒୆ െ	
p୒୆ െ p୔୐
q୒୆ െ ሺq୔୐ ൅ μ୔୅ሻ ; 	D୔୐ 	ൌ 		
p୒୆ െ p୔୐
q୒୆ െ ሺq୔୐ ൅ μ୔୅ሻ 	െ 	
p୔୐
q୔୐ ൅ μ୔୅ ;	D଴ ൌ 	
p୔୐
q୔୐ ൅ μ୔୅ 
 The computed equilibrium (Appendix A.3) is depicted inFigure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Optimal PA intensity with respect to the NB product. 
 
As q୒୆ increases, retailer R1 also increases its store brand advertising μ୔୅, resulting 
into too little differentiation between R1’s products, possibly leading to no NB demand at the 
end (when q୒୆ ൐ 0.55). 
2.4 Equilibrium Advertising Strategy 
 In this section, R1 was challenged by a retailer selling a higher quality product. R1 is 
thus concerned not only about market coverage (and the null demand) but also about 
competition with R2. Total R1 demand will thus depend not only on ߠீଶ/௉௅ but also on ߠ଴/௉௅. 
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Irrespective of the advertising strategy, R1’s demand rises while R2’s demand 
decreases. Additionally, market coverage increases due to the pro-competitive effect of 
publicity which increases the value for money. 
Advertising is always a profitable strategy for R1 as shown in Table 2.10  
 
Proposition 1: R1 always chooses the Store Advertising strategy. For a sufficiently high 
quality level of the NB product, R1 can force R2 to leave the market by increasing its store 
advertising intensity. 
 
Proof: Table 3 shows that ߎଵௌ஺ ൐ ߎଵ௉஺ ൐ ߎଵ஻, and for q୒୆ ൐ 0.42, ߎଵௌ஺௠ ൐ ߎଵௌ஺ while 
ߎଶௌ஺ ൌ 0. 
Qualities	 Benchmark	 Store	Advertising Product	Ad.	
Duopoly	ሺSAሻ Monopoly	ሺSAmሻ
q୒୆	 q୔୐	 Πଵ୆	 Πଶ୆	 μୗ୅ Πଵୗ୅ μୗ୅୫ Πଵୗ୅୫ μ୔୅	 Πଵ୔୅	
0.05 0.025 0.007 0.058 0.153 0.018 0.447 -0.041 0.000 0.007 
0.1 0.05 0.012 0.053 0.158 0.024 0.424 -0.021 0.001 0.012 
0.15 0.075 0.018 0.049 0.163 0.029 0.403 -0.005 0.003 0.018 
0.2 0.1 0.022 0.045 0.169 0.034 0.384 0.010 0.006 0.022 
0.25 0.125 0.025 0.041 0.176 0.038 0.368 0.022 0.009 0.025 
0.3 0.15 0.028 0.037 0.187 0.042 0.354 0.033 0.014 0.028 
0.35 0.175 0.031 0.033 0.202 0.045 0.341 0.041 0.021 0.031 
0.4 0.2 0.032 0.030 0.245 0.049 0.330 0.048 0.029 0.033 
0.45 0.225 0.033 0.026 0.284 0.053 0.320 0.054 0.040 0.034 
0.5 0.25 0.034 0.023 0.250 0.056 0.311 0.059 0.055 0.035 
0.55 0.275 0.034 0.020 0.218 0.057 0.303 0.062 0.160 0.037 
0.6 0.3 0.033 0.017 0.187 0.056 0.296 0.064 0.166 0.038 
0.65 0.325 0.032 0.014 0.158 0.054 0.289 0.065 0.171 0.038 
0.7 0.35 0.031 0.012 0.130 0.051 0.283 0.065 0.174 0.039 
0.75 0.375 0.029 0.009 0.104 0.046 0.277 0.065 0.177 0.039 
0.8 0.4 0.027 0.007 0.080 0.041 0.271 0.063 0.179 0.039 
0.85 0.425 0.024 0.005 0.058 0.035 0.265 0.061 0.180 0.039 
0.9 0.45 0.022 0.003 0.037 0.029 0.259 0.059 0.181 0.038 
0.95 0.475 0.019 0.001 0.018 0.022 0.253 0.056 0.180 0.037 
0.98 0.49 0.017 0.001 0.007 0.018 0.250 0.054 0.179 0.037 
Table 2: Advertising Equilibrium in the CS case (grey zone is not relevant at equilibrium). 
 
                                                            
10 The figures in Table 3 result from numerical resolution. 
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 The argument of SA vs PA choice is that the PA strategy reduces NB demand whereas 
it is the product on which R1 makes the higher unit margin. Note that as in Mills (1995) or 
Bontems et al. (1999), the unit margin on the NB is higher than on the PL, but this is reversed 
when considering relative margins. This result is validated by empirical studies on the 
competition between NB and PL, such as those by Dhar and Hoch (1997), Ward et al. (2002), 
Chintagunta (2002) or Ailawadi and Harlam (2004). 
Additionally, by choosing the SA strategy, R1 can increase its profits by becoming a 
monopoly on the market as long as the NB quality is high enough. In this case, the excess of 
store advertising generates an anticompetitive outcome by decreasing the number of firms on 
the market, namely by making the commodity store disappear. 
 
Proposition 2: An increase in store advertising (SA) induces an increase in both of R1’s 
products prices ( ݌ே஻  and ݌௉௅ ), while R2 must lower its price ( ݌ீଶሻ  due to stronger 
competition. 
 
Proof:  
ୢ୮ౌై
ୢஜ౏ఽ ൌ 1 ൅
ሺସା୯ౌైି୯ొాሻሺିଵ଴ା୯ొామሻ
ସሺିସା୯ొాାஜ౏ఽሻమ ൐ 0		ሺfound	with	numerical	resolutionሻ	
ୢ୮ొా
ୢஜ౏ఽ ൌ 1 ൅
ିଵ଴ା୯ొామ
ሺିସା୯ొాାஜ౏ఽሻమ ൐ 0		ሺfound	with	numerical	resolutionሻ	
dpୋଶ
d	μୗ୅ ൌ
െ10 ൅ q୒୆ଶ
2ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ μୗ୅ሻଶ ൏ 0	
 
The increase in store advertising intensity results in an increased willingness-to-pay 
for the PL and the NB, translating into higher prices to finance the advertising campaign since 
the PL-NB quality differential does not change. However, R2’s price decreases in order to 
limit the decrease in demand due to a higher competitive supply from R1. 
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 The second structural possibility is that R1 may be facing a hard-discounter with lower 
perceived quality. We thus analyze the same advertising strategies in this new set-up. 
 
3. Competition against a Hard-Discounter 
 
In this situation, retailer R1 sells a high quality product (NB) and a private label. The 
competitor he faces is a HD who sells a low quality product G2: ݍୋଶ ൏ ݍ௉௅ ൏ ݍ୒୆ ൌ 1. 
Solgaard and Hansen (2003) found that consumers’ perception of HD was lower than that of 
mass-retailers, translating into a lower willingness-to-pay.11 We first define the benchmark 
equilibrium (choice of PL quality), characterized by the fact that retailer R1 does not 
advertise. We then look for the optimal advertising strategies and derive the equilibrium 
chosen by R1. 
3.1 Benchmark 
We first compute demands by characterizing the indifferent marginal consumers. We 
denote ߠ଴/ீଶ ൌ 	 ୮ృమ୯ృమ  the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying the hard-
discount good G2 in R2 or nothing, ߠீଶ/௉௅ ൌ 	 ௣ುಽି୮మ௤ುಽି	୯మ  the marginal consumer who is 
indifferent between buying the hard-discount good G2 or the PL product in R1 and ߠ௉௅/ே஻ ൌ
	୮ొాି௣ುಽଵି௤ುಽ  the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying the NB product or the PL 
product in R1.12 Then, demands for products are defined by: 
ܦே஻ ൌ 1 െ	୮ొాି௣ುಽଵି௤ುಽ	 	;			D୔୐ 	ൌ 	
୮ొాି௣ುಽ
ଵି௤ುಽ	 െ 		
௣ುಽି୮ృమ
௤ುಽି	୯ృమ 	; 	Dଶ 	ൌ 		
௣ುಽି୮ృమ
௤ುಽି	୯ృమ െ	
୮ృమ
୯ృమ and 	D଴ 	ൌ 	
୮ృమ
୯ృమ 
                                                            
11 They estimated a multinomial discrete choice Bayesian logit using data from a survey of grocery shopping in 
the greater Copenhagen metropolitan area (Denmark). 
12 Recall that q୒୆ ൌ 1. 
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These definitions are valid only if: ߠ଴/ீଶ ൏ ߠீଶ/௉௅ ൏ ߠ௉௅/ே஻ . It translates into 
conditions on prices that have to be checked at the equilibrium. 
Retailers’ profits are given by: 
Πଵ஻ ൌ ܦே஻. ቀ	݌ே஻ െ ଵଶቁ ൅ ܦ௉௅. ሺ݌௉௅ െ
௤ುಽమ
ଶ ሻ  and  Πଶ஻ ൌ ܦீଶ. ሺ	݌ீଶ െ
௤ಸమమ
ଶ ሻ 
Using backward induction, that is, maximizing ߨଵ  with respect to ሺ݌ே஻, ݌௉௅ሻ	 while 
maximizing ߨଶ with respect to ݌ீଶ leads to: 
pୋଶ ൌ െ 3െ4 ൅ q1 െ
q1
2 		; 		p୒୆ ൌ
3q1
8 െ 2q1 		and	p୔୐ ൌ
1
4qሺq െ
6
െ4 ൅ q1 െ q1ሻ 
Resulting in: 
ߨଵ஻∗ሺݍ௉௅, qୋଶሻ ൌ 8ݍ௉௅
ସሺെ2 ൅ qୋଶሻ ൅ qୋଶଶ െ ݍ௉௅qୋଶሺ8 ൅ 3qୋଶሻ ൅ ݍ௉௅ଷሺ16 ൅ ሺ8 െ 13qୋଶሻqୋଶሻ ൅ ݍ௉௅ଶሺ16 ൅ qୋଶሺെ40 ൅ ሺ35 െ 4qୋଶሻqୋଶሻሻ
16ሺെ4ݍ௉௅ ൅ qୋଶሻଶ  
and ߨଶ஻∗ሺݍܲܮ, qG2ሻ ൌ ݍܲܮሺݍܲܮെqG2ሻሺ2൅ݍܲܮെqG2ሻ
2qG2
4ሺെ4ݍܲܮ൅qG2ሻ2
 
 
Retailer R1 maximizes his profit with respect to ݍ௉௅. Because analytical expressions 
cannot easily derive the optimal ݍ௉௅∗ , we use numerical resolution imposing q୔୐ ൏ 1. Figure 4 
represents the optimal PL quality with respect to the quality of the HD since the quality of the 
NB is set to 1. 
 
Figure 4: Optimal PL quality with respect to the HD product. 
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Due to the classical competition effect, it is quite logical that PL quality increases with 
competitor’s product characteristics, note however that product differentiation decreases as 
long as qୋଶ rises. For a high quality of the HD product (qୋଶ ൐ ଷସ), the choice of optimal PL 
characteristics leads to too little differentiation between NB and PL, and given that the NB 
price is higher than the PL price, the national brand demand becomes nil. Such a region is not 
relevant for our analysis. 
 
3.2 Store Advertising 
Store advertising impacts directly on the marginal consumer who is indifferent 
between buying the hard-discount good G2 or the PL product. The characterization of this 
consumer is now: ߠீଶ/௉௅ ൌ 	 ௣ುಽି୮మ௤ುಽା	ஜି	୯మ. The other marginal consumers are only affected by the 
price effect, regardless of the choice between NB and PL (since both products are sold in R1), 
or between G2 or nothing (quality is not concerned by the advertising). Demands for products 
and profits for firms are now defined by: 
ܦே஻ ൌ 1 െ p୒୆ െ ݌௉௅1 െ ݍ௉௅	 		 ; 	D୔୐ ൌ
p୒୆ െ ݌௉௅
1 െ ݍ௉௅	 െ	
݌௉௅ െ pୋଶ
ݍ௉௅ ൅ 	μௌ஺ െ	qୋଶ 	; 			Dୋଶ ൌ
݌௉௅ െ pୋଶ
ݍ௉௅ ൅ 	μௌ஺ െ	qୋଶ െ	
pୋଶ
qୋଶ ; 	D଴ 	ൌ
pୋଶ
qୋଶ 
Πଵௌ஺ ൌ ܦே஻	. ሺ݌ே஻ െ ଵଶሻ 	൅ ܦ௉௅	. ሺ	݌௉௅ െ
௤ುಽమ
ଶ ሻ െ ܿሺμௌ஺ሻ, with ܿሺμௌ஺ሻ ൌ
൫	ஜೄಲ൯²
ଶ  and Πଶௌ஺ ൌ ܦீଶ. ሺ݌ீଶ െ
௤ಸమమ
ଶ ሻ 
Using backward induction, that is, maximizing ߨଵ  with respect to ሺ݌ே஻, ݌௉௅ሻ	 while 
maximizing ߨଶ  with respect to ݌ீଶ  leads to ߨଵௌ஺∗ሺݍ௉௅, ݍୋଶ, μௌ஺ሻ  and ߨଶௌ஺∗ሺݍ௉௅, ݍୋଶ, μௌ஺ሻ , 
analytical expressions are given in Appendix B.1. Incorporating the optimal PL quality from 
the benchmark and maximizing Πଵௌ஺ with respect to 	μௌ஺ leads to the optimal SA advertising 
intensity depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Optimal SA intensity with respect to the HD product. 
 
We observe a small decrease in 	μௌ஺  as ݍୋଶ  increases due to a lower product 
differentiation between G2 and PL, leading to lower prices and thus lower revenues. Indeed, 
the trade-off on advertising consisting in restricting competition on prices through an increase 
in 	μୗ୅, and financing the cost of a higher advertising investment results in a lower μୗ୅. In 
addition, an increase in advertising intensity would translate into more PL quantity sold to the 
detriment of the NB good, whereas the retailer’s margin is higher on the NB product. Both 
effects concordantly results in fewer rents to finance store advertising. 
 
3.3 Product Advertising 
Product advertising reinforces consumers’ confidence in the quality of the PL. We 
assume that the intensity of advertising is such that the perceived PL quality remains lower 
than the NB, translating into ݍ௉௅ ൅ 	μ௉஺ ൏ 	q୒୆ ൌ 1. Product advertising directly impacts on two 
marginal consumers: the consumer who is indifferent between buying the hard-discount good 
G2 or the PL product, and the consumer who is indifferent between buying the PL product or 
the NB. The new characterizations of these consumers are: ߠீଶ/௉௅ ൌ 	 ௣ುಽି୮ృమሺ௤ುಽାఓುಲሻି	୯ృమ  and 
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ߠ௉௅/ே஻ ൌ 	 ୮ొాି௣ುಽଵିሺ௤ುಽାఓುಲሻ	. This kind of advertising has no direct effect on the choice between the 
PL product and the NB sold at R1. Demands for each good become: 
ܦே஻ ൌ 1 െ	 p୒୆ െ ݌௉௅1 െ ሺݍ௉௅ ൅ ߤ௉஺ሻ			 ; 	D୔୐ ൌ
p୒୆ െ ݌௉௅
1 െ ሺݍ௉௅ ൅ ߤ௉஺ሻ	 െ	
݌௉௅ െ pୋଶ
ሺݍ௉௅ ൅ ߤ௉஺ሻ െ	qୋଶ 	; 	Dଶ 	ൌ 				
݌௉௅ െ pୋଶ
ሺݍ௉௅ ൅ ߤ௉஺ሻ െ	qୋଶ െ	
pୋଶ
qୋଶ ;	D଴ 	ൌ 	
pୋଶ
qୋଶ 
Retailer R1 chooses the amount of advertisement ߤ௉஺  maximizing his profits: 
Πଵ௉஺ ൌ 	ܦே஻	ሺ݌ே஻ െ ௤ಿಳ
మ
ଶ ሻ 	൅ ܦ௉௅	ሺ	݌௉௅ െ
௤ುಽమ
ଶ ሻܦ௉௅	 െ ܿሺߤ௉஺ሻ  while R2’s profit is given by: 
Πଶ௉஺ ൌ ܦீଶሺ݌ீଶ െ ௤మ
మ
ଶ ሻ. Figure 6 depicts the equilibrium value of the PA equilibrium (see 
Appendix B.2). 
 
 
Figure 6: Optimal PA intensity with respect to the HD product. 
 
 Like in the previous equilibrium, as qୋଶ increases, we observe a small decrease in 	μ୔୅ 
due to the same product differentiation effect. There exists however a threshold such that 
differentiation between goods becomes so small that revenues cannot finance a positive PA 
investment. 
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3.4 Equilibrium Advertising Strategy 
 R1 is a retailer faced with a HD competitor, implying that by selling a NB and a PL, he 
is the retailer selling the “good quality” range (devoted to high-willingness-to-pay 
consumers). The main competition issue between R1 and the HD will thus concern the 
position of the marginal consumer ߠீଶ/௉௅ defining R1’s total demand. Note that for a given 
qୋଶ , 	μ୔୅ ൏ 	μୗ୅  because PA lowers differentiation between the NB and PL, thereby 
increasing interbrand competition and thus resulting in lower rents from the NB. Also, 
regardless of the advertising strategy, R1’s demand rises while R2’s demand decreases. 
However, market coverage increases due to the pro-competitive effect of publicity, lowering 
R2 price. 
Advertising is always a profitable strategy for R1 as shown in Table 3.13  
 
Proposition 3: R1 chooses the Store Advertising strategy irrespective of PL quality. 
 
Proof: Table 3 shows that ߎଵௌ஺ ൐ ߎଵ௉஺ ൐ ߎଵ஻. 
 
Such a choice allows R1, on the one hand, to keep constant the differentiation between 
products within his store (as in the benchmark) and on the other hand to differentiate his PL 
from the HD product more. Unlike store advertising, the product advertising strategy would 
cannibalize retailer R1’s NB sales, which are those on which he makes the highest margin. 
Karray and Martín-Herrán (2009) found a similar result in a different context: when the NB 
manufacturer can also advertise his product and when PL advertising generates a positive 
externality on the competing product, the retailer should limit his PL advertising investment 
in order to restrict an increase in store competition between NB and PL. 
                                                            
13 The figures in Table 2 result from numerical resolution. 
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Additionally, demand for the NB is not affected by the store advertising strategy with 
respect to the benchmark. This is the result of R1’s internalization of the publicity impact on 
the NB/PL marginal consumer, ߠ௉௅/ே஻ ൌ 	 ୮ొాି௣ುಽଵି௤ುಽ , translated by a constant price differential 
between both goods since the quality gap does not change by definition of the SA. 
 
Qualities Benchmark Store Advertising Product Advertising 
ݍୋଶ ݍ୔୐ Πଵ஻ μௌ஺ Πଵௌ஺ μ௉஺ Πଵ௉஺ 
0.05 0.518 0.072 0.242 0.101 0.116 0.086 
0.1 0.547 0.066 0.241 0.094 0.103 0.079 
0.15 0.582 0.060 0.240 0.088 0.087 0.072 
0.2 0.621 0.054 0.239 0.081 0.072 0.065 
0.25 0.662 0.049 0.237 0.075 0.057 0.057 
0.3 0.703 0.043 0.235 0.069 0.044 0.050 
0.35 0.743 0.038 0.233 0.063 0.033 0.043 
0.4 0.783 0.033 0.231 0.057 0.024 0.037 
0.45 0.821 0.029 0.228 0.052 0.016 0.031 
0.5 0.858 0.025 0.225 0.047 0.010 0.026 
0.55 0.893 0.021 0.222 0.042 0.006 0.022 
0.6 0.927 0.017 0.220 0.038 0.003 0.018 
0.65 0.959 0.014 0.217 0.034 0.001 0.014 
0.7 0.989 0.012 0.215 0.030 0 0.012 
0.75 1 0.009 0.217 0.028 0 0.009 
0.8 1 0.007 0.223 0.026 0 0.007 
0.85 1 0.005 0.230 0.026 0 0.005 
0.9 1 0.003 0.238 0.026 0 0.003 
0.95 1 0.001 0.245 0.028 0 0.001 
0.98 1 0.001 0.249 0.030 0 0.001 
Table 3: Advertising Equilibrium in the HD case. 
 
As mentioned earlier, when ݍୋଶ  is high enough (greater than 0.7), the optimal ݍ୔୐ 
systematically leads to no differentiation between qualities of the NB and the private label, 
which is an irrelevant situation. 
 
Proposition 4: An increase in store advertising (SA) induces an increase in both of R1’s 
product prices ( ݌ே஻  and ݌௉௅ ), while R2 must lower his price ( ݌ீଶሻ  due to stronger 
competition. 
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Proof:  
݀݌௉௅
݀μܵܣ ൌ
݀݌ே஻
݀μܵܣ ൌ
1
2 െ
ݍீଶሺ2ݍ௉௅ଶ ൅ ሺെ3 ൅ ݍீଶሻݍீଶሻ
2ሺെ4ݍ௉௅ ൅ ݍீଶ െ 4	μܵܣሻଶ  
ൌ 8ݍ௉௅ሺݍ௉௅ െ ݍீଶሻ ൅ 2ݍ௉௅
ଶሺ1 െ ݍீଶሻ ൅ 6ݍ௉௅ଶ ൅ 3ݍீଶଶ ൅ ݍீଶଶሺ1 െ ݍீଶሻ ൅ 8μܵܣሺݍ௉௅ െ ݍீଶሻ ൅ 24ݍ௉௅μܵܣ ൅ 16μܵܣଶ
2ሺെ4ݍ௉௅ ൅ ݍீଶ െ 4	μܵܣሻଶ ൐ 0 
ୢ୮ృమ
ୢ	ஜ౏ఽ ൌ െ
୯ృమ൫ଶ୯ౌైమାሺିଷା୯ృమሻ୯ృమ൯
൫ିସ୯ౌైା୯ృమିସ	ஜ౏ఽ൯మ
൏ 0 (found with numerical resolution) 
 
 The increase in store advertising intensity results in a quality improvement of the PL 
and the NB, translating into higher prices to finance the advertising campaign since the PL-
NB quality differential does not change. However, R2’s price decreases in order to limit the 
decrease in demand due to a higher competitive supply from R1. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
 First, regardless of the nature of the competitor store format (CS or HD), the mass-
retailer always prefers to advertise his store image rather than his own-brand products. This is 
due to the fact that, as usual in this kind of framework, the unit margin on NB is higher than 
that on the PL.14 Therefore, the retailer has no incentive to increase his PL demand (partially 
to the detriment of NB demand) by choosing a product advertising campaign. Whereas private 
label advertising is observed on mass-media (TV, radio, press, etc.), it is never chosen by R1 
in our model. This stems from the fact that, in our model, we only focus on “pure” product 
advertising strategy. Actually, product strategy may be wider in the sense that the retailer’s 
image may also be enhanced, therefore benefiting also other products sold to a lesser extent. 
 
                                                            
14 In the vertical differentiated quality model, the high‐quality good exhibits a higher unit margin than the low‐
quality one since the structure of the cost is common to both products. 
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 Second, some considerations about social welfare have to be made. Irrespective of the 
nature of competition that R1 faces (CS or HD), consumers’ surplus as well as social welfare 
are higher with ‘store strategy’ advertising than in the benchmark. The reason is that 
advertising, in our model, is always utility-improving. The market power R1 gains from more 
product differentiation, translating into higher final prices, is always overridden by an 
increase in the value for money. Furthermore, market coverage always increases because 
either R2’s price falls (HD case) or the value for money of the PL increases (in the CS case). 
Only retailer R2 is worse-off when R1 implements a SA strategy. Moreover, R1 always 
benefits from advertising whatever the strategy implemented. Also, when the retailer 
increases his store advertising investment, it results in an increase in both NB and PL prices. 
This effect is also present in Karray and Martín-Herrán (2009) but with severe limitations due 
to their specification of consumer preferences towards advertisement and horizontal 
differentiated goods. In our model this finding is independent of the magnitude of 
differentiation between goods and also integrates the endogeneity of PL quality by the 
retailer. 
 
 Third, from a more general perspective, we showed that allowing retailers to mass-
advertise may result in the exclusion of commodity stores (representing an anti-competitive 
outcome) but not the exclusion of the hard-discounter. The intuition is that advertising may be 
a way to improve perceived quality and thus may reduce the opportunity cost generated by a 
limit pricing policy to exclude the rival, making the exclusion strategy profitable. It is worth 
bearing in mind that this strategy arises when the quality of the national brand and the private 
label is high enough, or in other words, when the commodity store does not possess enough of 
a specific advantage compared to the mass retailer (transportation costs are low making 
location not so important in consumers’ preferences). In addition, the fact that the retailer is 
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not able to deter HD stores relies on the range of product offered, where the HD has the low-
quality good and thus does not face competition for the low-WTP consumers. In France, we 
have observed a decline in commodity stores (from 30% in 1980 down to 4% in 2009) while 
hard-discount retailers have gained more than 11% of market share over this same period.15 A 
partial explanation may be that the increase in PL quality (reducing the quality gap with 
national brands in commodity stores) has made advertising strategies by mass-retailers more 
harmful towards commodity stores, accelerating their demise. 
 
 Some extensions of the model should be considered in order to get a better picture of 
the economic mechanisms at play in advertising strategies. For instance, another possibility is 
to take into account that the majority of NB manufacturers use advertising and this may 
impact not only on R1 but also on R2’s sales. Another issue concerns vertical relationships 
since the advertising strategies of the retailer may differ from the one the manufacturer would 
choose, which mainly aims to increase NB demand. This requires consideration of a more 
complex framework to take into account different objectives between manufacturers and 
retailers regarding advertising strategies, but also to include intermediate prices so that the 
manufacturer may influence retailers’ choices. 
 
 
  
                                                            
15 This trend is general in Europe as described by Colla (2004). 
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Appendix A 
(Competition with commodity stores) 
 
A.1 Equilibrium in prices and profits with the SA strategy: 
 
pୋଶୗ୅ሺݍ௉௅, q୒୆ሻ ൌ 2 െ
െ10 ൅ q୒୆ଶ
2ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ μሻ	
p୒୆ୗ୅ ሺݍ௉௅, q୒୆ሻ ൌ μ
ሺെ3 ൅ 2μሻ ൅ q୒୆ሺെ3 ൅ 4μሻ
2ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ μሻ 	
p୔୐ୗ୅ሺݍ௉௅, q୒୆ሻ ൌ ሺݍ௉௅ሺെ6 ൅ ݍ௉௅ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ሻ െ ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ሻq୒୆ሻ െ 6ߤ ൅ ሺ4 ൅ ݍ௉௅ െ q୒୆ሻሺݍ௉௅ ൅ q୒୆ሻߤ ൅ 4ߤ
ଶሻ
ሺ4ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ ߤሻሻ 	
 
πଵୗ୅ሺq୔୐, q୒୆ሻ ൌ 1144ቆെ9ሺ16 ൅ ሺݍ௉௅ െ q୒୆ሻሺݍ௉௅ ൅ q୒୆ሻ
ଶሻ ൅ 9ݍ௉௅
ସ
ݍ௉௅ ൅ μ െ
12ሺെ10 ൅ q୒୆ଶሻଶ
ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ μሻଶ
െ ሺെ10 ൅ q୒୆
ଶሻሺെ86 ൅ 5q୒୆ଶሻ
െ4 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ μ െ
4ሺെ1 ൅ q୒୆ଶሻଶ
െ1 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ μ ቇ	
πଶୗ୅ሺq୔୐, q୒୆ሻ ൌ െ ሺ2 ൅ ሺെ3 ൅ q୒୆ሻq୒୆ െ 3μሻ
ଶ
4ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ μሻଶሺെ1 ൅ q୒୆ ൅ μሻ	
 
A.2 Equilibrium profits with the SAm strategy when R1 is a monopoly: 
 
ߨଵୗ୅୫ሺݍ௉௅, q୒୆ሻ ൌ 164 ሺെ4ሺ16 ൅ ሺݍ௉௅ െ qNBሻሺݍ௉௅ ൅ qNBሻଶሻ ൅
4ݍ௉௅ସ
ݍ௉௅ ൅ ߤ െ
4ሺെ10 ൅ qNBଶሻଶ
ሺെ4 ൅ qNB ൅ ߤሻଶ ൅
െ380 ൅ 68qNBଶ െ 3qNBସ
െ4 ൅ qNB ൅ ߤ െ
ሺ2 ൅ qNBଶሻଶqNB ൅ ߤ ሻ	
ߨଶୗ୅୫ሺݍ௉௅, q୒୆ሻ ൌ 0	
 
A.3 Equilibrium in prices and profits with the PA strategy: 
 
pୋଶ୔୅ሺq୔୐, q୒୆ሻ ൌ െ 3െ4 ൅ q1 െ
q1
2 		
p୒୆୔୅ሺq୔୐, q୒୆ሻ ൌ 3q18 െ 2q1	
p୔୐୔୅ሺq୔୐, q୒୆ሻ ൌ q୔୐ሺെ6 ൅ q୔୐ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ሻ െ ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ሻq୒୆ሻ െ ሺ6 ൅ ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ሻq୒୆ሻμ4ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ሻ 	
	
πଵ୔୅ሺq୔୐, q୒୆ሻ ൌ 116	ቆ
q୒୆ሺ36 െ q୒୆ሺ60 ൅ ሺെ6 ൅ q୒୆ሻq୒୆ሺ2 ൅ q୒୆ሻሻሻ
ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ሻଶ ൅
q୔୐ସ
q୔୐ ൅ μ െ
ሺq୔୐ଶ െ q୒୆ଶሻଶ
q୔୐ െ q୒୆ ൅ μ ቇ	
πଶ୔୅ሺq୔୐, q୒୆ሻ ൌ െ ሺെ2 ൅ q୒୆ሻ
ଶሺെ1 ൅ q୒୆ሻ
4ሺെ4 ൅ q୒୆ሻଶ 	
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Appendix B 
(Competition with hard discounters) 
 
 
B.1 Equilibrium in prices and profits with the SA strategy: 
 
݌ே஻ௌ஺ ሺݍ௉௅∗ ݍ௉௅, ݍீଶሻ ൌ 18ቆ6 െ 3ݍீଶ ൅ ݍீଶ
ଶ ൅ 4ߤ ൅ ݍீଶሺ2ݍ௉௅
ଶ ൅ ሺെ3 ൅ ݍீଶሻݍீଶሻ
4ݍ௉௅ െ ݍீଶ ൅ 4ߤ ቇ	
݌௉௅ௌ஺ሺݍ௉௅, ݍீଶሻ ൌ
ሺݍ௉௅ ൅ ߤሻሺ2ݍ௉௅ሺ2 ൅ ݍ௉௅ሻ ൅ ሺെ4 ൅ ݍீଶሻݍீଶ ൅ 4ߤሻ
8ݍ௉௅ െ 2ݍீଶ ൅ 8ߤ 	
݌ீଶௌ஺ሺݍ௉௅, ݍீଶሻ ൌ ݍீଶሺݍ௉௅
ଶ ൅ 2ݍ௉௅ሺ1 ൅ ݍீଶሻ ൅ 2ሺݍீଶሺെ1 ൅ ߤሻ ൅ ߤሻሻ
8ݍ௉௅ െ 2ݍீଶ ൅ 8ߤ 	
 
 
ߨଵௌ஺ሺݍ௉௅, ݍீଶሻ ൌ 1144 ሺെ9ݍ௉௅ሺെ1 ൅ ݍ௉௅ ൅ ݍ௉௅
ଶሻ െ 3ݍீଶሺ2ݍ௉௅
ଶ ൅ ሺെ3 ൅ ݍீଶሻݍீଶሻଶ
ሺെ4ݍ௉௅ ൅ ݍீଶ െ 4ߤሻଶ ൅
4ሺݍ௉௅ଶ െ ݍீଶଶሻଶ
ݍ௉௅ െ ݍீଶ ൅ ߤ
൅ ሺ10ݍ௉௅
ଶ ൅ ሺ15 െ 7ݍீଶሻݍீଶሻሺ2ݍ௉௅ଶ ൅ ሺെ3 ൅ ݍீଶሻݍீଶሻ
4ݍ௉௅ െ ݍீଶ ൅ 4ߤ ൅ 9ሺ1 ൅ 2ሺെ1 ൅ ݍீଶሻݍீଶ ൅ 4ߤሻሻ	
ߨଶௌ஺ሺݍ௉௅, ݍீଶሻ ൌ ݍீଶሺߤ ൅ ݍ௉௅ሻሺ2ߤ ൅ ݍீଶ
ଶ ൅ ݍ௉௅ሺ2 ൅ ݍ௉௅ሻ െ 2ݍீଶሺ1 ൅ ߤ ൅ ݍ௉௅ሻሻଶ
4ሺߤ െ ݍீଶ ൅ ݍ௉௅ሻሺݍீଶ െ 4ሺߤ ൅ ݍ௉௅ሻሻଶ 	
 
B.2 Equilibrium in prices and profits with the PA strategy: 
 
p୒୆୔୅ሺݍ௉௅, ݍீଶሻ ൌ 18ቆ6 ൅
2qୋଶሺq୔୐ሺെ6 ൅ q୔୐ ൅ 2qୋଶሻ ൅ 2ሺെ3 ൅ qୋଶሻμሻ
4q୔୐ െ qୋଶ ൅ 4μ ቇ ;	
p୔୐୔୅ሺݍ௉௅, ݍீଶሻ ൌ
ሺq୔୐ ൅ μሻሺ2q୔୐ሺ2 ൅ q୔୐ሻ ൅ ሺെ4 ൅ qୋଶሻqୋଶ ൅ 4μሻ
8q୔୐ െ 2qୋଶ ൅ 8μ ;	
pୋଶ୔୅ሺݍ௉௅, ݍீଶሻ ൌ
qୋଶሺq୔୐ଶ ൅ 2q୔୐ሺ1 ൅ qୋଶሻ ൅ 2ሺqୋଶሺെ1 ൅ μሻ ൅ μሻሻ
8q୔୐ െ 2qୋଶ ൅ 8μ ;	
 
πଵ୔୅ሺq୔୐, qୋଶሻ ൌ 1144 ሺ18ሺെ1 ൅ qୋଶሻqୋଶ െ
3qୋଶሺ2q୔୐ଶ ൅ ሺെ3 ൅ qୋଶሻqୋଶሻଶ
ሺെ4q୔୐ ൅ qୋଶ െ 4μሻଶ െ
9ሺെ1 ൅ q୔୐ଶሻଶ
െ1 ൅ q୔୐ ൅ μ ൅
4ሺq୔୐ଶ െ qୋଶଶሻଶ
q୔୐ െ qୋଶ ൅ μ
൅ ሺ10q୔୐
ଶ ൅ ሺ15 െ 7qୋଶሻqୋଶሻሺ2q୔୐ଶ ൅ ሺെ3 ൅ qୋଶሻqୋଶሻ
4q୔୐ െ qୋଶ ൅ 4μ ሻ	
πଶ୔୅ሺq୔୐, qୋଶሻ ൌ qୋଶሺq୔୐ ൅ μሻሺq୔୐
ଶ െ 2q୔୐ሺെ1 ൅ qୋଶሻ ൅ qୋଶଶ ൅ 2μ െ 2qୋଶሺ1 ൅ μሻሻଶ
4ሺെ4q୔୐ ൅ qୋଶ െ 4μሻଶሺq୔୐ െ qୋଶ ൅ μሻ 	
 
